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INTRODUCTION
The discussion on international labor standards is sometimes confusing, as the term
‘labour standards’ is used actually referring to a number of different things that need
to be distinguished from one another:
• Labor standards and core labor standards:1 Labor standards are established by the
International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and implemented by national
governments and are, therefore, part of government legislation. A limited number of
labor standards have been established as the Core Labor Standards (CLS) that
apply to all ILO members (regardless of ratification status). ‘Decent work’ repre-
sents a more comprehensive approach towards the world of work and encompass-
es the core labor standards as well as other measures such as social protection
and social dialogue.
• A ‘social clause’ in trade agreement: This refers to the inclusion of labor issues
(through core labor standards or other measures) in trade agreements.
• Voluntary measures: This refers to voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR)
measures established by and for private corporations. The most common form of
CSR is the establishment of a so-called code of conduct, often based upon United
Nations (UN) or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
guidelines.
The above measures are not mutually exclusive but should be separated in the dis-
cussion, as they represent different approaches and mechanisms for enforcement
(Luce, 2005). 
The opposition to including compulsory labor standards within the multilateral frame-
work has made it increasingly popular to include them in bilateral and regional free
trade negotiations. The USA has a ‘labor clause’ in most of its agreements, and the
European Union (EU) has set out to include it as part of the sustainable development
section in its ongoing and future free trade agreements (FTAs). 
This paper aims to discuss the gendered nature of these measures, to highlight the
implications for women workers in developing countries. Part 1 deals mainly with the
definitions and general discussions around these issues, while Part 2 focuses on its
gender implications. The paper is mainly a study of the available literature within aca-
demia as well as relevant official documents and material from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).  
1
1 Throughout the publication both the American spelling ‘labor and the British spelling ‘labour’ is used.
This is due to the fact that both spellings are used in the different publications and documents dealing
with labor standards. This is also the case for the spelling of the word ‘organization’ and ‘organisa-
tion’. The author apologizes for any inconvenience this might cause when reading the paper.
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P A R T  1
CORE LABOR STANDARDS
‘Labor standards’ refers to legal instruments, negotiated within the tripartite structure
of the ILO, which set out basic principles and rights at work.2 They can either be a
legally binding international treaty that can be ratified by individual states, or recom-
mendations that function as non-binding guidelines. In 1995 the World Summit for
Social Development adopted the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development
and a Programme of Action which gives reference to so-called “basic workers’
rights”.3 When the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work in 1998, the following basic workers’ rights identified by the Copenhagen
Summit were confirmed as the four core labor standards:4
• Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining; 
• Elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor; 
• Effective abolition of child labor; and 
• Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
These four core labor standards cover eight ILO conventions:
• Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87)
• Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (No. 98)
• Forced Labour Convention (No. 29)
• Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105)
• Minimum Age Convention (No. 138)
• Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182)
• Equal Remuneration Convention (No.100)
• Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No.111).
It is important to note that the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work applies to all ILO members – regardless of whether they have ratified the indi-
vidual conventions or not (European Commission, 2001; Singh & Zammit, 2004).
According to the ILO, these conventions represent universal core standards for work-
3
2 At the International Labour Conference each delegation from member states is made up of two govern-
ment representatives, one representative for workers and one representative for employers. The
Governing Body of the ILO is made up of the same type of majority (Kaufmann, 2007:50). 
3 Chapter 3 of the Programme of Action deals with employment issues, and reference to the basic work-
ers’ rights is found in § 54(b), see: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/agreements/poach3.htm, 2008-
01-15
4 A very interesting critique of naming some labour standards ‘core’ standards is provided by Alston
(2004): “the concept ‘core’ standards constituted a very significant departure from the insistence with-
in the international human rights regime on the equal importance of all human rights.” (p.459f)
ing conditions in any country, regardless of development level or geographical con-
text. So-called ‘quantitative measures’ (that may vary between countries), such as
minimum wage, working hours, health and pension benefits, maternity leave and
other benefits such as paid holidays, have been excluded from what is considered
core labor standards due to political controversy (Luce, 2005). 
It is important to note that the idea of core labor standards is not to conflict with trade
liberalization. Instead, it is intended as a set of minimum standards: “and would stop
governments from trying to gain a competitive advantage through repression, dis-
crimination and exploitation of workers. A social clause seeks to ensure that the fun-
damental rights of workers are protected and is not intended to set international
wage levels or benefits.” (email interview, trade union official from Barbados, 2008) 
DECENT WORK
The most recent and comprehensive approach towards protecting workers’ rights is
the ‘decent work’ approach, launched by the ILO Director-General Juan Somavia in
1999. Decent work is defined by the ILO as “work taking place under conditions of
freedom, equity, security and dignity”. It is based upon the following four strategic
objectives: 
• Fundamental principles and rights at work and international labor standards;
• Employment and income opportunities; 
• Social protection and social security; and 
• Social dialogue and tripartism.
A key feature of the decent work paradigm is the link between these different com-
ponents. According to the ILO, the decent work agenda should apply to workers both
in the formal and informal economy, and it promotes decent-work-oriented approach-
es in partnerships with institutions and actors of the multilateral system. The decent
work agenda is implemented through various ILO conventions (notably several more
than the core conventions apply), but it can also include other international agree-
ments. The European Commission (EC) has defined the different international agree-
ments that can be applied to the decent work agenda in the Annex to their 2006 com-
munication, Promoting decent work for all. These include various UN conventions,
the Millennium Development Goals, the Beijing Platform for Action and Corporate
Social Responsibility. According to the communication, these other documents are
reference documents that can be ratified or used as a basis for programmes of action
independently of any ratification (European Community, 2006b). The ILO has devel-
oped decent work country programmes which define the priorities within national
development frameworks and aims to tackle major decent work deficits. 
The decent work agenda has been widely embraced by governments, trade unions
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and NGOs as an opportunity for a more ‘holistic approach’ towards rights and social
conditions for the world’s working population. It provides, according to Ghai, an
answer to the critical claims that ILO’s traditional work has been based on industrial
market economies which have, at best, only been applicable to the formal sector in
most developing countries (Ghai, 2006:4). 
A ‘SOCIAL CLAUSE’ IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
A social clause in the World Trade Organization
The relationship between trade and employment conditions has been discussed
since the 1947 Havana Charter.5 Suggestions to introduce mandatory labor standards
through a social clause in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have come from
developed countries:
“WTO rules and disciplines, they argue, would provide a powerful incentive for mem-
ber nations to improve workplace conditions. These proposals have been highly con-
troversial. Many developing and some developed nations believe the issue has no
place in the WTO framework. These nations argue that efforts to bring labour stan-
dards into the arena of multilateral trade negotiations are little more than a smoke-
screen for protectionism. Many officials in developing countries believe the cam-
paign to bring labour issues into the WTO is actually a bid by industrial nations to
undermine the comparative advantage of lower wage trading partners.” (WTO, 2003)
The USA and the EU have been the most prominent supporters of a social clause in
the multilateral framework. However, it is worth noting that the USA, despite its posi-
tion that labor standards should be included in trade agreements, has not yet ratified
many of the ILO conventions – as it argues that they do not comply with US law
(Dicken, 2007, ILO, 2005). 
There are three main sets of arguments for bringing a social clause into the WTO
framework: First, the ILO is considered to be too weak and has not been able to pre-
vent violations of its conventions. US trade unions argue that: “since the ILO has no
real enforcement power, many member countries’ labor laws still violate their core
labor standards” (AFL-CIO, 2002:1). Second, the WTO has a mechanism for enforcing
trade sanctions on countries that are violating ILO conventions. Third, a social clause
would force the WTO to be more socially responsible and, therefore, limit the nega-
tive effects of free trade under the WTO (Greenfield, 2001). Busser argues that: “with-
out a social floor in the system, the increased competition has deteriorated lives of
5
5 Article 7 of the 1947 Havana Charter set out the role and functions of the then proposed International Trade
Organization, and contains explicit reference to the obligation of members to ensure fair labor standards:
http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf, 2007-08-29
workers” (Busser, 2006:99). Even if the proponents see a social clause as a ‘social
floor’, they emphasize that this measure alone is not an effective enough measure to
better working conditions. They may need to be accompanied by a broader set of poli-
cies to be effective (Berik & van der Meulen Rodgers, 2007). Equally, the issue of
enforcement is emphasized - a social clause in an agreement may, on paper, be com-
prehensive, but if there is a lack of commitment from the parties signing the agree-
ment the situation may, in reality, not be improved (interview, ITUC official, 2007).
Critics of a social clause claim that the unequal power relations within the WTO make
it an inappropriate forum to deal with labor rights. In practice, rich countries in the
North have more influence over decisions taken within the WTO framework. In the
case of labor rights, the result might be that the countries most affected will have very
little influence over the structure that is being set up (Luce, 2005). NGOs have also
raised concerns regarding the handing over of workers’ rights issues to the WTO:
“The WTO should be subordinate to other international institutions in instances
where trade issues may have wider repercussions. The WTO should also undergo
significant internal reform before it could become capable of supporting workers’
rights” (War on Want, document undated). According to Greenfield, union demands
to include core labor standards into the framework of the WTO is ironic because: “the
very logic of the WTO is that everything is a commodity”, while the very first principle
adopted by the ILO in 1944 was that “labor is not a commodity” (Greenfield, 2001:18).
Greenfield lists four main objections to bringing a social clause into the WTO. First,
only governments can make complaints to the WTO. This means that trade unions,
NGOs and other social movements cannot pose claims of violations of labor rights to
the WTO. Governments make decisions based upon a number of interests where
political, economic, military and foreign policy interests may be superior to workers’
rights issues. In this way workers’ rights may become a bargaining tool in other for-
eign or trade policy issues. Second, violations of core labor standards would be treat-
ed as any other trade dispute. Hence, decisions would be based upon whether the
violation will lead to unfair trade. The ban of trade unions in Export Processing Zones
(EPZs) are a violation of core labor standards – the issue at hand is if such a ban
makes the exports from that country cheaper, and are they, therefore, competing
unfairly against other exporters of the same commodity. Thus the real meaning of uni-
versal workers’ rights will be lost. Third, trade disputes will involve states, not
transnational corporations (TNCs). Sanctions will be imposed upon the country
where the violation is taking place – not against the company violating the workers.
The process of disputes can take many years, and before the decision is made TNCs
can move to other countries where it is not necessary to follow core labor standards.
Meanwhile the country where the violation was taking place may face sanctions.
Fourth, sanctions are not limited to products under dispute. If a decision is made to
place sanctions against a country for violation of core labor standards, such sanc-
tions may be imposed for any export products. It is up to the government to decide
which products to restrict or ban (Greenfield, 2001).
6
Claims of Northern protectionism
The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work explicitly states that:
“the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called into question
by this Declaration and its follow-up”6 and that labor standards may not be used as a
protectionist measure. Even so, developing countries argue that compulsory mini-
mum standards within the WTO would be just another form of protectionist measures
imposed by developed countries against low-cost competition from developing coun-
tries (Dicken, 2007; Kabeer, 2004; Singh & Zammit, 2004). Developing countries oppose
the social clause with what has been called ‘a deep fault line of mistrust’. To them,
linking labor standards to trade agreements simply represents a ‘new form of condi-
tionality’ (Kabeer, 2004:7,8). 
The US trade union movement lists the following three main arguments for why core
labor standards are not a form of protectionism: 
• Business interests are already an important part of our trade law and there is,
therefore, no reason for why workers’ rights issues should be excluded from
such law; 
• most obligations that may result in sanctions do not – it is the credible threat of
sanctions that will encourage countries to comply with labor standards; and 
• a fair, transparent, equal and neutral multilateral dispute resolution system is
probably the most effective way to avoid narrow domestic interests as the basis
for trade sanctions (AFL-CIO, 2002). 
However, within the trade union movement in developing countries concerns have
also been voiced regarding the proposed social clause: “We should not be against
any measures supposed to protect workers rights. However, as a worker from a
developing country, I cannot support any protectionist measure and a social clause,
as proposed by industrialized countries, to be applied against developing countries
could become protectionist” (email interview, trade union official from Brazil, 2008).
A social clause in bilateral and regional free trade negotiations
As a result of the opposition to a social clause in the multilateral framework, it has
become increasingly popular to pursue labor rights objectives through bilateral and
regional trade policy. US trade agreements contain a standard ‘labor clause’ reaffirm-
ing the parties’ commitment to their membership in the ILO and the Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Many of the US agreements with devel-
7
6 Paragraph 5, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, available at:
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=D
ECLARATIONTEXT, 2008-01-15
oping countries go beyond core labor standards in the sense that they also include
the issue of minimum wage (Singh & Zammit, 2004).7
Current EU bilateral and regional free trade negotiations
For the EU it is an explicit political project to promote its values regarding sustainable
development through its external policies: “Trade has proved to be one of the most
effective tools to foster development” (European Community, 2005). In 2006 the EC
presented its communication, Global Europe: Competing in the World, which reaffirms
its support for this agenda: “As we pursue social justice and cohesion at home, we
should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental standards
and cultural diversity, around the world” (European Community, 2006:5). According to
the EC homepage, contrary to the current situation in the WTO, its bilateral relations
with third countries have allowed it: “to advance further on the promotion of social
rights”, and in future negotiations they intend: “to pursue its efforts to put sustainable
development at the heart of these agreements”.8 The Commission has presented a
number of communications dealing with the different social aspects of trade and
globalization, and it briefly summarizes the outcome of these communications as: 
“The essential elements to ensure a better contribution of trade to economic growth
and sustainable development, through the integration of trade and development
strategies, as resulting from these communications are: (1) sound macro-economic
policies, effective social governance, and human capital development, which include
the promotion of core labour standards; (2) better market access and balanced trade
rules to underpin domestic reform; (3) trade-related assistance and capacity building
to help developing countries with these tasks.” (EC Commission homepage,
accessed 2008-04-18) 9
Additionally, the application of core labor standards should be made through positive
instruments, and the Commission states its firm opposition to sanctions-based
approaches as well as the use of labor rights for protectionist purposes (Ibid.). 
8
7 For example, Article 18.8 in the US–Chile agreement defines the labor rights as the four core labor
standards of the ILO plus “(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours
of work, and occupational safety and health. For greater certainty, the setting of standards and levels
in respect of minimum wages by each Party shall not be subject to obligations under this Chapter.
Each Party’s obligations under this Chapter pertain to enforcing the level of the general minimum
wage established by that Party.”
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file853_
4012.pdf, 2008-02-06. An additional difference  between EU and US free trade agreements is that the
US agreements mostly do not contain references to human rights, while drafts for negotiations made
by the EU and a third country, since the 1990s, must contain a so-called ‘human-rights clause’ estab-
lished in the communication from the Commission COM(95)216.
8 The position that a social clause should be included in EU bilateral and regional trade agreements
also has strong support from many actors in the European Parliament. See, for example, PSE Group
(2008) and European Parliament (2008).
9 Trade and social conditions: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/social/index_en.htm, 2008-02-06.
In the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP+) the EU uses the incentives-based
approach to promote ratification and implementation of key international agreements
– including the core labor standards. The basic feature of the scheme is to grant
developing countries preferential access to the European market, with ‘vulnerable’
countries granted preferential access in exchange for the effective compliance of
core labor standards (European Community, 2001:2005b).10 Even though there are crit-
ics of the GSP+ system, it has strong support from many actors within the EU.11
As the EU pursues labor issues through a social clause in its bilateral and regional
free trade negotiations,12 it becomes increasingly important to analyse how labor
issues are being dealt with in the negotiations as well as the outcome of a social
clause in different geographical contexts. However, the lack of public information
available around the negotiations makes such analysis difficult. Even though the EC
reaffirms that sustainable development remains an important objective in all FTA
negotiations,13 the experience from the USA shows that labor concerns can be nego-
tiable depending on the political interest of the actors involved. One example is the
USA–Jordan FTA where the outcome of the negotiations was the removal from the
labor clause of the agreement of the core labor standard dealing with elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.14 When labor standards are
included in negotiations between parties with considerably different interests, levels
of development and capacity, there is a growing fear that labor issues will be used as
a bargaining tool between countries. This may result in differing standards between
agreements “and thus unequal levels of upholding social and environmental stan-
dards overall” (Vander Stichele, 2008:4). 
EU–India
In the case of the EU–India FTA, the Indian Government (known for its resistance to a
social clause in the multilateral process) declared, prior to the negotiations, its oppo-
sition to the inclusion of labor issues in the FTA. The EC mandate, however, includes
the commitments by both sides to sustainable development issues – including the
promotion of decent work and core labour standards (Wichterich, 2007). EC officials
9
10 The countries currently covered by GSP+ are: the five Andean countries (Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela), six Central America countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Panama), Moldova, Georgia, Mongolia and Sri Lanka (European Community, 2005b).
11 Berik & van der Meulen Rodgers (2007) argue that an incentive-based approach, like the one used
between the US and Cambodia, has been fruitful. They propose that the GSP+, or a similar system,
together with a credible monitoring programme, could prove an effective way to promote better
working conditions and wages.
12 An NGO perspective on the EU FTAs and a social chapter is presented in a paper by Vander Stichele
(2008).
13 See, for example, the statement by Ditte Juul-Joergensen in the WIDE report EU bilateral and region-
al free trade agreements: Bringing women to the centre of the debate, available at: http://www.wide-
network.org/index.jsp?id=316, 2008-04-17.
14 Article 6 US-Jordan FTA, available at:
http://www.jordanusfta.com/free_trade_agreement_text_en.asp, 2008-02-06 
publicly reaffirm their commitment to sustainable development issues and assure that
these issues are still ‘on the agenda’ in all FTA negotiations, including those with
India. However, others claim that there is information indicating that the Commission
has given in to resistance to a labor clause from its Indian counterpart.15 A non-pub-
lished internal document from the Commission reports that these issues are still high-
ly sensitive in the EU–India negotiations and that the discussions will continue “with-
out prejudice as to the outcome”.16 What this means is hard to know, and it is always
difficult to evaluate this type of unofficial information. However, it raises questions
regarding the difficulty in obtaining information on how far the EC is willing to go to
pursue its sustainable development objectives in the FTAs. If negotiations are made
without prejudice to the outcome, does that mean that the Commission would be will-
ing to accept an agreement with India which does not contain reference to core labor
standards? Or, as phrased by Vander Stichele: “Will the EU be willing not to sign a
free trade agreement with India, an important export market, if India refuses to
include environmental and social chapters?” (Vander Stichele, 2008:5). 
EU–ASEAN
The same type of questions can be raised around the early negotiations with the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is important to bear in mind that
this is a negotiation between two regions. Membership of the FTA is still a controver-
sial issue. The EU has opposed negotiating with all ten ASEAN countries (mainly due
to the issue of Myanmar/Burma), while ASEAN’s approach has been that all ASEAN
countries should be on board.17 The EC negotiation mandate includes commitment to
core labor standards,18 while ASEAN countries would prefer that issues relating to
sustainable development be covered by other types of co-operation outside the FTA
(Lindberg, 2007). Regional co-operation within these two regions is hardly compara-
ble. ASEAN co-operation on labor issues is only in its early days, and it has only had
a co-operation agreement with the ILO since 2007.19 In relation to the FTA negotia-
tions, ASEAN officials have raised concerns that they are “not ready” to include labor
issues (interview, ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). As previously discussed, the Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work applies to all ILO member countries,
regardless of ratification status. However, it is interesting to note that only three out
10
15 For example, statements by Ditte Juul-Joergensen (DG Trade) and Christa Wichterich (WIDE) at the
WIDE consultation, ‘EU bilateral and regional free trade agreements: Bringing women to the centre of
the debate’, Brussels, 22 November 2007.
16 Unpublished document from the EC entitled Report on 3rd round of EU–India FTA negotiations
(Brussels, 6–11 December 2007).
17 The controversy over Burma is also highlighted in the European Parliament Draft Report (2008): “the
current situation in Burma makes it impossible for that country to be included in the agreement.” (p.6)
18 As neither the mandate for negotiations nor the negotiations as such are made public, it is not possi-
ble to find the negotiation mandate through the EC official website. However, the mandate has been
published through www.bilaterals.org.
19 More information on ASEAN co-operation on labor can be found at:
http://www.aseansec.org/8627.htm 
of the ten ASEAN nations have ratified all the conventions covered by the core labor
standards.20 Considering ASEAN’s recent engagement with labor issues, this raises a
number of questions relating to how the process of improving labor standards should
be dealt with globally. Labor standards have previously been a competence handled
by the ILO. How does making ratification of ILO conventions a condition for an FTA
impact this work? What are the implications of linking the EU (and the US) trade agen-
da to the promotion of workers’ rights?
The Caribbean EPA
The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the CARIFORUM states is the most
recent example of how sustainable development issues are being framed in EU bilat-
eral and bi-regional relations. An interesting part of this EPA is that (under the section
dealing with investment, trade in service and e-commerce) it contains: “a more or
less binding obligation on the signing countries related to environmental and social
standards [through] a so-called ‘no lowering of standards clause’ when attracting
investment … [and] this Article is fully subject to the dispute settlement mechanism”
of the Agreement (Vander Stichele, 2008:7). The agreement also contains a social
chapter which includes a similar article, as well as commitment to the ILO core labor
standards, the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and
the 2006 Ministerial Declaration by the UN Economic and Social Council on Full
Employment and Decent Work. The parties also: 
“recognise the beneficial role that core labor standards and decent work can have
on economic efficiency, innovation and productivity, and they highlight the value of
greater policy coherence between trade policies, on the one hand, and employment
and social policies on the other … agree that labor standards should not be used for
protectionist trade purposes … recognise the benefits of commerce in fair and ethi-
cal trade products and the importance of facilitating such commerce between
them.”21
The social chapters are, however, subject to another type of dispute settlement, as its
interpretation and application “shall first be subject to consultations before being
brought to the dispute settlement” (Vander Stichele, 2008:7).22
Decent work
The EC also makes reference to the concept of decent work in the current bilateral
11
20 Ratification status of the core labor standards conventions can be found through ILOLEX: 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declworld.htm, accessed 2008-04-21
21 Article 191 of the EPA between the CARIFORUM states and the EU, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf, 2008-04-17
22 See Article 195 of the Agreement.
trade negotiations. In its communication on the promotion of decent work it states
that the decent work agenda, through its integrated approach: 
“… seeks not only to guarantee a minimum basis of rights but also to tailor develop-
ment values and principles of action and governance which combine economic com-
petitiveness with social justice. Combining economic competitiveness and social jus-
tice in this way is at the heart of the European model of development.” (European
Community, 2006:2) 
This illustrates one of the main critical concerns relating to the decent work agenda,
namely that the central dimensions of the decent work concept have been left vague.
The interpretation made by the EC (above) also highlights a point often made by its
critics, namely that the decent work agenda does not include any market controlling
mechanisms and should, therefore, not be seen as an attempt to enable states to
challenge, for example, corporate power. Instead, as argued by Vosko, the decent
work agenda represents an attempt to mediate the demands of global capital with the
critical voices striving to reform the ILO:
“There is no question that states remain powerful actors in the international system
but, to be effective and endow states with more control, any supranational measure
designed to improve labor standards and labor rights must initiate market-controlling
measures targeting global capital.” (Vosko, 2002:30)
Whether decent work standards will have a real impact on workers’ daily lives will be
determined by how effective its implementation will be – something which involves
more than legislation (Servais, 2004). According to Barrientos, current global produc-
tion systems pose a major challenge for the implementation of decent work: 
“The employment decisions of domestic suppliers are increasingly controlled by
meeting the requirements of large overseas corporate buyers. Yet these corporate
buyers are not themselves employers and operate beyond the control of national gov-
ernments in their sourcing countries. This provides an important challenge for attain-
ing decent work in global production systems. National channels for achieving qual-
ity employment, ensuring workers’ rights providing social protection and facilitating
social dialogue are undermined.” (Barrientos, 2007b:2)
The EU argues that decent work can be a useful instrument when negotiating trade
agreements. Although this approach should include more issues than the core labor
standards, it is still difficult to see how the decent work agenda can be effectively
implemented in the ongoing bilateral and regional negotiations. In the draft mandate
authorizing the Commission to negotiate an FTA with ASEAN the decent work
approach is included – but the promotion of decent work is limited to: “effective
domestic implementation of ILO core labour standards, as defined in the 1998 ILO
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as well as enhancing co-
operation on trade-related aspects of sustainable development” (European
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Community, 2007). And (even though the power of the European Parliament on these
issues is limited) it can be noted that the Parliament, often more focused on social
issues than the Commission, in a Draft Report on the EU–ASEAN negotiations, under-
lined the desire for commitment to core labor standards, while leaving out decent
work (European Parliament, 2008). Hence, it is hard to see what the decent work
approach brings in these negotiations – apart from the core labor standards.
3. VOLUNTARY MEASURES - CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) refers to the ethical behavior of businesses
towards its constituencies or stakeholders (Hopkins, 2004:1).23 Some definitions of
CSR also include reference to improving the lives of employees’ families, local com-
munities and the society at large (Pearson, 2007).
The globalized nature of consumption has put corporations under increasing pres-
sure from consumer and NGO activism campaigning for ethical labor practices.
Anticipated economic losses due to damages to the corporate image can, in part,
explain why large companies are producing codes of conduct and joining networks
for ethical trade. According to an OECD survey, the major motivation for adopting
codes is to protect company reputation. (Hale & Shaw, 2001; Jenkins, 2002; Pearson
& Seyfang, 2001). The corporate codes of conduct contain ethical standards for the
corporation (and sometimes also their suppliers) and are often based upon OECD or
UN guidelines for corporate responsibility codes (Jenkins, Pearson & Seyfang,
2002).24 The World Bank estimates that there are approximately 1,000 buyer codes
globally. The large number of codes and the variety of the standards they contain is:
“a source of inefficiencies and confusion that may limit their effectiveness” (World
Bank, 2003:17). There have been several initiatives to develop ‘universal’ codes, but it
has been difficult to find agreement as to the content of such a code. A key issue of
disagreement has been the issue of living wages (Maquila Solidarity Network, 2008). 
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23 Hopkins uses the following definition: “CSR is concerned with treating the stakeholders of the firm eth-
ically or in a responsible manner. ‘Ethically or responsible’ means treating stakeholders in a manner
deemed acceptable in civilized societies. Social includes economic responsibility. Stakeholders exist
both within a firm and outside. The natural environment is a stakeholder. The wider aim of social
responsibility is to create higher and higher standards of living, while preserving the profitability of the
corporation, for peoples both within and outside the corporation.” (Hopkins, 2004:1)
24 The most commonly referred to are: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf; and The UN Global
Compact: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
The impact and frequency of the codes varie between industries and sectors. They
are most common within the garment sector, which was one of the first to develop an
agenda for corporate responsibility that also included labor standards (Hale & Shaw,
2001, Wick, 2005). According to Pearson (2007), within manufacturing there are some
positive achievements regarding labor standards as a result of codes – in particular
where representatives of workers have been directly involved in the process of draft-
ing the code. However, other sectors, such as electronics, characterized by a produc-
tion chain, more complex codes are not as evident. Although this sector, for example
computer production, is characterized by a low-wage, low-skilled, predominantly
female labor force: “unlike their counterparts in the clothing and footwear sector,
computer companies have thus far escaped scrutiny on labor issues” (Pearson,
2007:734).25 This illustrates a major weakness of these voluntary and self-regulatory
measures, namely that they only apply to specific firms or groups of firms and, there-
fore, to certain workers at a certain point in time. Government regulations, such as
core labor standards, apply to all workers or citizens in a particular country (Pearson
& Seyfang, 2001, Pearson, 2007). Therefore, it is important, critics argue, that the
codes should be regarded as a supplement to government policy regulating TNC
activities instead of replacing such policy (Wick, 2005:30f). Another major criticism of
CSR is that the codes can be a way of privatizing international labor standards (Hale
& Shaw, 2001).
In 2001 the EU launched its Green Paper Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility, which promotes the view that in the context of glob-
alization companies are becoming increasingly aware that CSR can be of direct eco-
nomic value: 
“Although the prime responsibility of a company is generating profits, companies can
at the same time contribute to social and environmental objectives, through integrat-
ing corporate social responsibility as a strategic investment into their core business
strategy, their management instruments and their operations.” (European Community,
2001b:5) 
The ‘win-win’ scenario painted by the Commission is a common perspective in litera-
ture on CSR. Through CSR, corporations can increase profits at the same time as sup-
porting sustainable development objectives. It is significant that most writings on CSR
have their background in business studies and are mostly ‘business friendly’
(Coleman, 2002, Prieto-Carrón, 2006). Discussions of power are uncommon in the dis-
cussion on CSR and corporate citizenship. Therefore, conflicting interests between
actors or inequalities of power are rarely addressed. In this way the political nature
of corporate citizenship is moved aside to give room only to a practical, strategic or
maybe ethical discussion: “To step beyond this procedural, legal-rational discussion
is to leave the ‘business’ terrain and enter forbidden and frightening territory, in which
humans struggle to make sense of the world” (Coleman, 2002:22). 
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25 Quoted from a CAFOD report (2004) entitled Clean up your computer: working conditions in the elec-
tronics sector, available through www.cafod.org/uk.
The EC Green Paper received more than 250 responses, and it is interesting to note
that the Commission (2002) acknowledges that there are “significant differences
between the positions” expressed – maybe somewhat contradictory to the win-win
approach to CSR painted above. Key differences in the responses were that corpo-
rate actors stressed the voluntary nature of CSR and that there would not be a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ solution. Regulating CSR at the EU level could, they argued, hamper cre-
ativity and innovation and “could lead to conflicting priorities for enterprises operat-
ing in different areas”. On the other hand, trade unions and NGOs stressed that vol-
untary initiatives are not enough to protect workers’ and citizens’ rights. They also
argued for minimum standards and that implementation and evaluation cannot be left
entirely up to business actors (European Community, 2002). 
Finally, the Commission argues, in line with corporate actors, that for CSR it is difficult
to identify a global framework “due to the diversity in domestic policy frameworks,
protection of workers and environmental regulation” (European Community, 2002:7).
Considering the Commission’s strong dedication towards the promotion of universal
labor standards, it is somewhat difficult to understand why it would not be possible to
also establish universal minimum demands for the behaviour of business.  
The EU underlines that the implementation of CSR practices should go over and
above the legal requirements for business. Equally the approaches should involve
local stakeholder consultations. Even if this sounds good in theory, it may be worth
noting that one of the most common criticisms of codes of conduct is that they are
drafted without the participation of workers – especially not women workers
(Pearson & Seyfang, 2002).
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P A R T  2 :
GENDER, CORE LABOR STANDARDS, 
DECENT WORK AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 
Historically, women workers hold a marginal position in discussions on workers’
rights. Instead, such rights have been developed with male, full-time and regular
employment as the model. For a feminist analysis a central question is how these
measures impact the conditions for women workers also performing informal, home
and casual work (Singh & Sammit, 2004). Also, are women being represented in the
forums articulating workers’ rights – in trade unions, governments, international
organizations and corporations?
When attempting to approach workers’ rights issues from a feminist perspective
there are both methodological and theoretical problems. The prevailing definition of
‘work’ is waged labor in a formally structured employment relation – a definition
based upon a masculine ideal of ‘work’. Equally important is that what is regarded as
‘work’ is a result of both social and statistical definitions which have a variety of
meanings. Data can therefore be difficult to compare (McDowell, 1999). 
The exclusion of the informal sphere
In the current global economy, a majority of the world’s workers are working in the
informal sector. Additionally, formal-sector employment is increasingly characterized
by ‘informalization’ and ‘flexibilization’ (Kaufmann, 2007). For women workers this
development is especially contradictory as “the increasing informalisation of employ-
ment, even within export sectors, has left the majority of the female workforce out-
side regimes of welfare and social protection at the very historical moment when they
have taken a vanguard role in the construction of the export labour force” (Pearson,
2007:736). 
The informal-sector work force includes a variety of workers, for example, owners
and workers of micro-enterprises, self-employed, dependent workers, unpaid family
workers, apprentices, contract workers, home workers and paid domestic workers.
According to Kaufmann, the way in which the formal and informal economies inter-
act has evolved, and: “The informal economy can no longer be defined as everything
that is not included in the formal economy, because such a narrow concept fails to
include the increasing mobility of workers between the two.” (Kaufmann, 2007:5) 
Core labor standards, no matter how effective, are limited to work in the formal
sphere. They do not apply to vast numbers of people working in the informal sector
(Luce, 2005). The EC also acknowledges this issue: “In many developing countries, a
large part of the local economy is informal and unregulated. Poorer people are heav-
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ily reliant on the informal sector, both as workers and consumers, and they conse-
quently tend to be less well protected by core labor standard agreements.” (European
Community, 2001:12) 
Understanding the nature of the labor force – where workers are found in both formal
and informal production – is a key to understanding the gender impacts of measures
to protect workers’ rights. As argued by Pearson: “Even if the state were able and
willing to enforce compliance with labour protection within the formal economy, this
would apply to a minority of the labour force; given the over-representation of women
in the informal economy, such compliance would not protect the female labour force
working in the informal sector” (Pearson, 2007:737). Both men and women work in the
informal sector, but women face multiple challenges of discrimination based upon
both their employment status and gender ideologies. In this way the rights of women
workers are inextricably linked to the subordination of women in production through
their concentration in less secure forms of employment (Barrientos, 2007a,b). 
Trade union organization, collective bargaining and employment strategies require a
strong employer attachment. A large share of the female labor force does not fit this
employment ‘norm’ – because they lack regular employment. ‘Feminized’ employment
in the informal, domestic and home-work sector is, therefore, overlooked within core
labor standards. This may have further implications, as in the case of the social pro-
tection pillar of decent work. The lack of access to contracts and legal employment
benefits for many flexible and informal workers may also mean that they have denied
other forms of social assistance and protection from the state (Barrientos, 2007a,b;
Elias, 2007). The result is that women are often excluded, not only from the issues tra-
ditionally covered by ‘workers’ rights’, but also from meaningful access to welfare
and social protection (Pearson, 2007). 
In the discussion around core labor standards feminist critics have been successful
in the sense that, for example, the decent work agenda, activities of trade unions and
the ILO now recognize work taking place outside the public sphere. It is, however, dif-
ficult to evaluate what implications this will have. One example is that even though
many acknowledge that core labor standards do not apply to a majority of women’s
work, it is still argued that they can be regarded as ‘universal’ in character. This is
usually justified by the fact that these rights have been accepted by all ILO members
and can, therefore, be expected to apply to all workers worldwide (Interview, ITUC
official, 2007). This argument, however, fails to consider the traditionally marginalized
position of women in institutions working with labor rights, such as the ILO and trade
unions (Hale & Turner, 2005; Pearson & Seyfang, 2002) (see below for further discus-
sion). Singh & Zammit (2000; 2004) have suggested that the ILO conventions on free
collective bargaining and freedom of association need to be redrafted to also include
core issues for workers in developing countries. 
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Challenging the underlying causes of gender discrimination
To some groups of developing countries the exploitation of cheap female labor has
been closely linked with export orientation and an important part of attracting foreign
corporations. As argued by Joekes: “…industrialization in the post-war period has
been as much female led as export led” (Joekes, 1987:81). As women form the major-
ity of the workers in low-skilled, labor-intensive sectors and are concentrated in the
lower segments of the occupational hierarchies, they are particularly vulnerable to
both individual and structural discrimination and abuse (Pearson, 2007). Feminist crit-
ics argue that the debate around core labor standards has failed to consider that gen-
der discrimination forms the basis for women’s employment conditions in the global
economy. By failing to address these issues, core labor standards are inadequate in
addressing the pressing needs of many groups of women workers (Barrientos, 2007a;
Elias, 2007).
It is interesting to note that an integral part of the argument in favour of a social
clause is that it should not in any way question the comparative advantage of devel-
oping countries. None of the approaches (core labor standards, decent work or CSR)
challenge the subordination of women in the working sphere. Through the decent
work agenda the ILO has attempted to address the rights at work for all – including
workers in the informal sector, self-employed and casual workers (ILO, 2000).
Although this provides the possibility for a more ‘holistic’ approach to enhancing
workers’ rights, there are still challenges when “addressing embedded gender dis-
crimination in the context of global production systems” (Barrientos, 2007a:251).
Feminist critics argue that we need to acknowledge that gender inequality is an inte-
gral feature of market economy. As expressed by Elias:
“By failing to consider the way in which gender-inequality is a fundamental feature
of global systems of production and employment, approaches to labour standards,
such as the CLS, that simply contain commitments to non-discrimination and ‘equal-
ity of opportunity’ are partial and inadequate in their capacity to address the needs of
many groups of women workers.” (Elias, 2007:47)
This point is supported by Pearson (2007). She points to the contradictions of the busi-
ness approaches which, on the one hand recognize that gender needs to be taken
into account while persistently ignoring the reasons for why female workers are a
central part of their competitive strategy: “Indeed, there is a fundamental contradic-
tion between aspirations for such gender sensitive policies, and the nature of global
competition in which these corporations are involved” (Pearson, 2007:739). Feminist
scholars have often pointed out that it is not possible to separate the individual story
of discrimination from structures of oppression. For example, studying banana work-
ers at Chiquita in Latin America, Prieto-Carrón argues that a major factor preventing
CSR practice from benefiting women workers is “the existence of ‘hidden’ structural
problems in the political economy of the banana industry and its gendered nature”
(Prieto-Carrón, 2006:85). Some women’s organizations and other NGOs have called for
instruments such as core labor standards to be reformed, with the aim of also includ-
ing mechanisms to address the cause of biases (Vosko, 2002). 
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Core labor standards and decent work as 
‘universal’ principles
Universality and particularity
Core labor standards are promoted as a minimum level of workers’ rights. As such,
they are described as ‘universal’ in character and apply to all workers worldwide. In
the ILO publication, Decent Work: Objectives and Strategies, Ghai describes the
decent work paradigm, not only as universal, but its principles also represent the
“desires” and “wishes” of “all working people in all societies”:
“Working people in all societies desire freedom of association and oppose discrimi-
nation, forced labour and child employment in hazardous situations. They wish to par-
ticipate through social dialogue in decision-making affecting their work and lives,
both at the level of the enterprise and the national and at regional and global levels.
Likewise, all people and all societies desire work in conditions of dignity and safety
and with adequate remuneration. Finally, a modicum of social and economic securi-
ty in work and life is a universal aspiration.” (Ghai, 2006:4)
Through this, the decent work paradigm highlights questions around “universality”
and “particularity” (Ghai, 2006). From a feminist perspective this raises a number of
questions. Elias (2007) argues that as the international labor standards increasingly
draw upon the universalist discourse there is a need for critical feminist engagement
with these issues. There is vast scholarship dealing with gender and human rights
discourse. These have shown that a ‘universal’ – as in non-gender differentiated –
‘human’ is in fact implicitly a reference to men, to the male body, experience and
stereotypical attributes. Women are often excluded from the universal category and
represent the “particular” or “partial” (Peterson & Parisi, 1998). Early discussions on
‘human rights as men’s rights’ have common ground with contemporary feminist cri-
tique of core labour standards. Kouvo (2004) describes the historic relationship
between feminists and international human rights as ambivalent. Feminist perspec-
tives range from a defence of liberal rights regimes to radical conceptualizations of
rights: 
“Where on this trajectory, different scholars situate themselves, is largely dependent
on how the idea of rights is viewed. That is, if rights are viewed as intrinsically and
inescapably and immutably male or if rights are viewed as having the potential of
transcending the initial exclusion in symbolic, politico-legal and institutional terms.”
(Kouvo, 2004:61) 
It has been more difficult, within feminist scholarship and activism, to find a consen-
sus around issues relating to economic rights – compared to issues such as violence
against women. One explanation could be the limitations of the human rights
approach in addressing the complex nature of socio-economic inequalities. Many
feminists have deliberately avoided using a ‘human rights’ language in the discussion
on labor standards. One reason, according to Elias (2007), could be that the way the
19
human rights discourse has been captured by the development mainstream in a man-
ner that could curtail the possibilities for feminist human rights activism. However,
some have pointed to the recent re-engagement within the feminist movement with
economic rights: 
“with activists using the language of human rights in a strategic manner in order to
‘challenge the operation of contemporary capitalism’.26 This strategic usage of eco-
nomic rights is a potentially fruitful one because it has the potential to force a re-eval-
uation of the link between economic liberalism and economic rights.” (Elias, 2007:49)
‘Core’ standards or political compromise? 
Although proponents of core labor standards claim that these standards represent a
universal minimum standard, there are critical voices. To Elias (2007), they do not rep-
resent universal human standards. Instead she agrees with Alston’s point that:
“the choice of standards to be included in the CLS was not based on the consistent
application of any coherent or compelling economic, philosophical, or legal criteria,
but rather reflects a pragmatic political selection of what would be acceptable at the
time to the United States and those seeking to salvage something from what was
seen as an unsustainably broad set of labour rights.” (Alston, 2004:485) 
This is an important argument. Especially considering that many issues central to
women workers have been left out of the discussion on core labor standards (Luce,
2005). Issues such as minimum wage, working hours, health and pension benefits and
maternity leave are left outside the scope of core labor standards. Although the
emphasis upon different rights may vary, Alston argues that most critics of the core
labor standards regime agree that the list of ‘core’ rights should also include the right
to a safe and healthy workplace, some limits on working hours, reasonable rest peri-
ods, and protection against abusive treatment in the workplace. 
The discussion above illustrates the difficulties in making claims of what are the ‘uni-
versal’ wants and needs of (women) workers. However, research from different parts
of the world can help illustrate that the priorities of women workers may vary from
those rights established through the core labor standards. Pearson and Seyfang
(2002) refer to consultations made with women workers in Central America. The
workers were asked to draw up a ‘wish-list’ for what they wanted to be included in a
code of conduct. Apart from reflecting the desire to continue to work in export facto-
ries, they wanted a code that assured working conditions that defended their dignity
and proper remuneration, avoided arbitrary and inhumane treatment, guaranteed
freedom of association and collective bargaining, and protected them from harm –
both in terms of harassment and unhealthy working conditions. This was accompa-
nied by the understanding that all production does not take place in the formal sphere
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26 Elson and Gideon (2004) quoted in Elias (2007)
and, therefore, workers’ entitlements should also include home-workers – including
protection and respect for pregnant women, the banning of enforced overtime and
the restriction of the working day to eight hours. In a workshop in Bangladesh host-
ed by Women Working Worldwide, women workers named management harassment,
lack of secure contracts, sub-survival wages, absence of contracts, prohibition of
union activities, forced overtime and absence of maternity rights as aspects of their
working conditions. When they drafted a code of conduct it included minimum wage
for a minimum labor standard, maximum working hours (including overtime), statuto-
ry leave for holidays, maternity and social benefits, rights to collective bargaining,
health and safety, social security, no discrimination, and sanctions against violations
of these aspects (Pearson & Seyfang, 2002:44f).
An important point is to acknowledge that the priorities of women workers may differ
from those of male workers. One reason is the gendered organization of domestic and
household commitments – where women have to balance between their domestic
work and employment-related responsibilities (Pearson, 2007). It is, therefore, crucial
to investigate what women workers, in different places and positions, want. And how
are their voices being heard? Kabeer poses the critical claim that NGOs and trade
unions have tried to speak for ‘poor working women’ in the South:
“That many of the export industries in the South produce consumer goods … has
worked to the advantage of this form of advocacy because consumer purchasing
power can be a powerful weapon. Moreover, that a significant proportion of workers
in these factories is women allows such advocacy to both feed on and feed into,
widespread perceptions about poor, Third World women as helpless victims of the
global free-trade economy: ‘undifferentiated, homogenous, faceless and voiceless’
(Diane Wolf, 1992). Such portrayals help to both provoke and to justify action by the
northern public on behalf of these workers who are unable to act on their own
behalf.” (Kabeer, 2004:10) 
Kabeer also reminds us that women workers in different places may not necessarily
share the same priorities or have the same needs. She argues that a “perspectives
from below” would reveal that workers in the South may make different choices from
those in the North:
“When those who support the social clause express fears about the ‘race to the wel-
fare bottom’, they serve to remind us that workers in different parts of the world are
inserted into this race on very different terms. In the poorer countries of the world,
socially protected full-time employment only ever applied to a very small proportion
of the total labor force … It applied to an even smaller proportion of working women
in these countries, the vast majority of whom were to be found in the informal econ-
omy, which provided little or no protection of any kind. These latter are likely to have
different livelihood priorities from those who have enjoyed, and are now seeking to
defend, relatively high levels of social protection.” (Kabeer, 2004:26)
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Gendered perspectives on possible job losses 
and employment
As investments have become more sensitive to increasing labor costs, the actual bar-
gaining power of workers to increase their wages has decreased. This development
is especially important for workers in ‘mobile’ industries – where production is typi-
cally labor-intensive (and female-dominated) and moving production to other loca-
tions with cheap labor is ‘easier’. Even though the demand for female labor rises
faster than the demand for male labor, the gender wage gap is persistent.27 According
to Seguino (2003), one explanation for this is the gender-segregated labor market –
where men are found in more capital-intensive ‘immobile’ production, while women
are found in labor-intensive ‘mobile’ production which is easier to relocate. Because
of this, the threat of a company relocating because it can pay lower wages elsewhere
limits women’s bargaining power relative to capital. In addition to other social and
economic constraints, gender segregation in the labor market has left women more
vulnerable in terms of their position to bargain for better wages. The threat of job loss-
es as a result of higher wages is of special significance to women workers in devel-
oping countries. Seguino concludes that for the labor standards and living wages
strategies to work they need to be accompanied by policies aimed at reducing the
risk of job losses.28 Women are often more cautious of losing their jobs also because
of the limited economic opportunities offered to them in society. 
Even though conditions of work may be difficult, the employment offered in labor-
intensive production is, for many women in developing countries, their first opportu-
nity for paid work in the formal sector. According to Kabeer, labor rights campaigns
have focused on the low wages of women workers in the garment sector compared
with the wages in their own countries. It is, however, important to remember that this
is not what influences women’s employment decisions in, for example, Bangladesh:
“Instead, it is wages and conditions that prevail in the alternative forms of employ-
ment available to them, together with the prospect of having no job at all, that exer-
cise the greatest influence” (Kabeer, 2004:25). Because of this, she is skeptical of
claims that women’s working conditions in export-oriented production will improve
through linking global labor standards to trade agreements. However, Dominguez et
al. (forthcoming) contest Kabeer’s views and argue that we do not need to “accept
the supply-side model of development based upon the industrialization for exports as
the only alternative for women’s development and greater dignity” (Dominguez et al.,
forthcoming:4). They argue that their findings from studies in Central America paint a
different picture compared to Kabeer’s. They do not agree on the supposed positive
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27 Seguino has conducted interesting research on gender wage inequalities and has shown that these
also play an important part in gender inequalities in other areas. Closing the gender wage gap can
alter power positions and increase women’s bargaining position in the home and in society. It can
also lead to a shift in the unequal distribution of unpaid work between women and men.
28 For further reading on the suggested policies, see Seguino 2003:24–26.
impacts of this type of employment for women compared to informal-sector work or
on the impact it has had on women’s autonomy. Observations from Central America
seem to contradict the view that labor conditions are better in export industries. 
Busse & Spielmann (2005) discuss the fact that labor standards, through a social
clause, will only target working conditions for women working within export produc-
tion. It will not tackle gender biases in other parts of the labor market. If sanctions are
imposed, through a social clause, this may in fact drive women into other sectors –
with potentially lower labor standards. They use the experience from the banning of
child labor in the garment industry in Bangladesh as an example. UNICEF reported
that as children were banned from the factories, as a result of boycott pressure from
the USA, most of them ended up in more dangerous type of work. However, Berik and
van der Meulen Rodgers argue that improved enforcement of labor standards togeth-
er with full employment policies can, in fact: “help provide women with more job
security, assist women in gaining access to a wide range of better paying jobs in
occupations that have traditionally been male-dominated” (Berik & van der Meulen
Rodgers, 2007:6).
The discussion illustrates the complexities and place-based differences that need to
be taken into account when discussing the impact of these instruments. There is no
conclusive economic evidence that labor standards reduce employment. According
to Luce (2005), the outcome is context-specific, depending on a variety of economic
and political variables. It is, therefore, not possible to predict the specific outcome for
employment when labor standards are established. Luce proposes that we should not
focus on the labor standards in themselves or regard them as a solution to poor work-
ing conditions, rather “as a tool to aid in further organising” (Luce, 2005:27).
Dominguez, et al., (forthcoming) equally argue that contextualization is of crucial
importance when making comparisons that may have policy-related outcomes and
for the choice of strategy.
Lack of women’s voices
The issue of women’s marginal position in trade unions and the institutions dealing
with labor policies has been extensively discussed within public and academic
debate (Razavi, 1999). The ILO has addressed this issue within the decent work agen-
da as an attempt to promote a more gender-sensitive approach (ILO, 2000). The trade
union movement is also working to promote gender equality within trade unions and
highlighting the importance of women’s participation in trade union work (ITUC, 2007).
In discussions of CSR and corporate citizenship the voices of women are still largely
absent (Coleman, 2002).
However, the changes in global production systems pose a challenge to core labor
standards and, especially, the rights pillar in the decent work agenda which is defined
through the ILO core conventions. Representing or organizing workers within more
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flexible, insecure and informal work provides a real challenge for the trade union
movement – even if there are several recent examples of this being done. Informal
workers, highly mobile workers, i.e. migrant or contract workers, have very limited
possibility for collective action or power to negotiate with employers (Barrientos,
2007b). Also in formal work places trade unions have failed to sufficiently address the
needs of women. Despite extensive empirical evidence, it has rarely been recognized
that the priorities of women workers may actually differ from those of male workers
(Razavi, 1999, Pearson, 2007). Trade unions are often represented by a male-dominat-
ed leadership which has often failed to integrate women’s voices and experiences.
When trade unions fail to address gender issues, women regard them sceptically
(Barrientos, 2007a). There are also geographical differences in how trade unions
organize and in female participation. Kabeer (2004) discuss the situation in South
Asia, and poses the critical claim that “not only are most male trade unionists large-
ly indifferent to their [women’s] needs and priorities as workers, but they also tend to
reproduce the norms and behaviour that treat women as a subordinate category and
marginalize their needs and priorities as women” (Kabeer, 2004:22f). Dominguez, et al.
(forthcoming) argue that there are similar findings in Central America, where unions
have failed to acknowledge or actively promote women workers’ rights. 
Women working in the formal sector also keep their responsibilities in the informal
sector. Time restraints are, therefore, an important factor in women’s ability to organ-
ize or join unions (Barrientos, 2007a). The lack of women’s voices in the forums that
address the needs and wants of workers is also pointed out by trade unions in other
developing countries:
“… a critical examination of core labour standards in context specific situations
should bring out more gender dimensions than has been happening. For example the
right to association raises gender concerns when we begin to ask who are the peo-
ple involved, how many men and women, why so few women, what rights of women
are at stake when there are so few women, etc.” (email interview, trade union offi-
cial from Ghana, 2008)
The lack of participation of women workers within the forums that define and articu-
late what is gender discrimination has important implications for what is considered
the needs and priorities of workers. Poster, therefore, argues that “We need to con-
solidate and integrate our definitions in a way that recognizes the multiplicity of what
workers actually articulate and experience as discrimination” (Poster, 2001:102).
Voluntary schemes
The critics of a social clause have sometimes voiced the advantage offered by volun-
tary schemes such as through codes of conduct. For example, Kabeer argues that
codes can play a role in holding corporations accountable for working conditions.
However, there are many critical concerns relating to the CSR schemes. Even if codes
of conduct are based upon ILO standards and, on paper, have comprehensive
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schemes to protect worker’s rights and health, the question of effective monitoring
and implementation of the codes is crucial. It will not be sufficient to rely on corpora-
tions to self-regulate compliance (Berik & van der Meulen Rodgers, 2007; Hale &
Shaw, 2001). A critical question is also whether the corporate codes indicate a real,
long-term commitment, or if they are merely a public relations exercise. Voluntary
codes seem to be sensitive to issues covered in the media. It is illustrative that one of
the first codes of conduct came from Levi Strauss in 1992 and was a direct result of
an article in the Washington Post about how Chinese prisoners were producing Levi
jeans. It is also worth noting that the codes are most common in companies that deal
directly with consumer products (Hale & Shaw, 2001, Pearson, 2007). Issues that
upset consumers are more likely to appear explicitly articulated in the codes. For
example, child labor is mentioned in a majority of the codes, while issues relating to
the rights of women or migrant workers do not receive the same attention. According
to Pearson and Seyfang, this reflects the fact that “the codes [are] being adopted as
a response to NGO campaigns, and being aimed primarily at developed country con-
sumers, rather than tackling problems faced by a diverse set of vulnerable worker
groups” (Pearson & Seyfang, 2001:56). 
From a feminist perspective there are additional issues relating to CSR practices.
Labor markets are gendered institutions “which reflect socially constructed divisions
of labour embedded in economies which are themselves gendered structures”
(Pearson, 2007:736). Codes only address formal, regulated employment, while infor-
mal and reproductive work go beyond their scope. They are, therefore, only applica-
ble to workers who have formal employment contracts (Ibid.). 
Angela Hale and Jane Turner have studied codes of conduct within the garment
industry from a gender perspective and, like Barrientos, they argue that the codes
have not been developed in light of the specific problems or interest faced by women
workers – rather they reflect existing regulation based on the experience of, predom-
inantly, a male full-time workforce. A key issue is, therefore, the impact of the codes
for the many women employed on a casual basis in smaller unregulated workplaces
(Hale & Turner, 2005). For the codes of conduct to be effectively implemented, they
must be developed in co-operation with local workers as well as local organizations
(such as trade unions or NGOs). For them to also protect the rights and needs of
women, ensuring representation of female workers in this process is crucial.
Research has also shown that local representatives, be they workers or trade union
officials, are often men with little or no knowledge of the conditions for or special
needs of female workers. Therefore, topics of special relevance to women workers
are not mentioned in discussions around the codes. To understand the gendered
impact of corporate codes of conduct, we need to look at the process through which
the codes have been developed. How is the code formulated, and who has taken
part? Have women workers, their organizations or representatives been a part of the
process (Pearson & Sefang, 2002)? As stated by Pearson & Seyfang “what is on the
agenda and who is being invited to the negotiating table?” (Pearson & Seyfang,
2001:50). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The review of the literature and discussion has shown that there is no unified femi-
nist position on the inclusion of labor standards in trade policy. However, it is possi-
ble to extract some core feminist concerns relating to core labor standards, decent
work and CSR: 
• Core labor standards, as well as CSR schemes, only relate to work in the formal
sector and, therefore, do not cover a majority of women’s work – which is taking
place outside the formal sector 
• What has been named ‘core labor standards’ excludes many central concerns
articulated by women workers
• In relation to formal sector work, there are still many constraints for women in
getting involved in the forums that define workers’ rights (including government
bodies, trade unions and corporations) 
• Gender discrimination forms an integral part of the market economy. Measures
which do not challenge the underlying causes of gender discrimination risk
upholding gender divisions and oppression as well as spreading the perception
among policymakers that gender issues are being adequately addressed
• Gender hierarchies and divisions of labor impact the needs of workers. The pri-
orities of women workers often differ from those of male workers. Equally, work-
ers in the South may make different choices to those in the North.
There are many questions regarding the effectiveness of self-regulatory voluntary
schemes, such as CSR through codes of conduct:
• Codes of Conduct only address formal regulated employment. Hence, work in the
informal sector is outside their scope;
• The Codes only apply to workers in a specific corporation at a specific point in
time; 
• Issues relating to implementation, enforcement and effective monitoring of the
Codes are of crucial importance when evaluating their impact for women work-
ers. It is not enough to rely on corporations to self-regulate compliance of the
Codes; 
• The Codes are sensitive to issues covered by the media in developed countries,
and there is a substantial risk that what is covered in the codes reflects the
desires of consumers in developed countries rather than the needs of women
workers in developing countries;
• Women workers need to be involved in the process of drafting the codes in order
for them to also cover issues prioritized by women workers. 
Finally, a pressing issue for further discussion are questions around conditionality.
The EU has clearly stated that it sees trade policy as a useful way to promote what it
calls ‘our values’. It argues that trade incentives have proven useful to strengthen
26
social and human rights. It is crucial to continue the discussion around the possible
risks involved when subordinating workers rights to the free trade agenda. What
implications will this have in different parts of the world? What implications will this
have in the struggle for women’s rights and social justice?
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